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The Natanson requirement of a professional duty limited by what other
practitioners would have disclosed in the same or similar circumstances was
also adopted by Wilson. The court did not comment on the division of the
burden in proving that duty, and, in fact, seemed to overlook the prob-
lems involved in that area.
There was one interesting development in the Wilson decision, however.
The court allowed the plaintiff to establish the professional standard by
calling the defendant Wilson as an adverse expert witness. By his ad-
missions as to his opinion of the standard and by his agreement with a
passage from a medical textbook, Dr. Wilson provided Scott with all the
expert evidence he needed to prove the objective professional standard."'
Although some courts would disagree with this procedure48 Wilson is not
the only case which has relied on this method of proof.48
The rule that breach of duty is a lay question which requires no expert
testimony was adhered to by Wilson." The case, like most cases in this
area, resolved itself into a swearing match between the doctor and the
patient as to what disclosures were made. In Wilson the patient claimed
the doctor failed to inform him of a one per cent chance of complete loss
of hearing; the doctor, after testifying that the professional standard
would require this disclosure, claimed that he had told Scott of the one
per cent possibility.
V. CONCLUSION
Two student Notes proclaim that the extended liability generated by
the action of informed consent may increase communication between the
doctor and the patient." Yet, it is left up to the medical profession whether
disclosures to patients will be increased or merely made uniform. By the
use of standard "risk" forms practitioners will be virtually assured that
their disclosures are uniform to the profession. It is only when the doc-
tor attempts to take the individual patient's circumstance into considera-
tion that he will be inviting liability. The new liability might thus tend
to force the doctor to follow objective standards of disclosure. What the
patient may gain through increased communication, if there is any, will
be lost through decreased personal consideration.
David R. Snodgrass
Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Staying Proceedings
The federal judicial system normally does not permit appeal from inter-
locutory orders. Although this policy is a strong one, Congress has pro-
4 1id. at 303.
"' Lane v. Calvert, 138 A.2d 902 (Md. Ct. App. 1958).
4 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964).
"Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (1967).
"See Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445, 1449 (1960); Note, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 799, 803 (1966).
128 U.S.C. S 1291 (1964); see Comment, Requiem for the Final judgment Rule, 45 TFXAS
L. REv. 292 (1966).
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vided in section 1292 of the Judicial Code that certain interlocutory or-
ders may be appealed Subsection (a) (1) of this provision allows appeal
from orders involving injunctions. Determining whether a particular
order is or is not appealable as an injunction under this subsection is not
always easy, for certain modern procedural orders are held to be equiva-
lent to injunctions,3 though they bear different names and lack the char-
acteristics usually associated with injunctions.4 In certain circumstances an
order granting or refusing to stay proceedings in the plaintiff's action is
included in this category and is appealable under section 1292 (a) (1).
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The basis for permitting interlocutory appeals from stay orders lies in
history. When law and equity were heard by separate courts, the defendant
could not raise an equitable defense in a law court. Instead, he had to bring
'The relevant portion of the statute provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . .granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, . . .except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court; . . .
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance . . .
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may,
* . . in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ...
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
3Because the injunction as a legal concept has had a long and complex history, it is somewhat
hazardous to venture a broad definition of the term. According to Professor Moore, an injunction is:
an order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing something that is an integral
part of the very matter in litigation or for the protection of the court's jurisdiction
over the matter in litigation, and invokes the normal equitable principles underlying
the injunctive process.
6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 55 54.06(3), 54.07 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
' For a number of years there has been a dispute between the Second and Third Circuits over
whether an order denying a motion for summary judgment is appealable as a refusal of an injunc-
tion when the relief the plaintiff seeks on his claims is a permanent injunction. In Morgenstern
Chem. Co. v. Schering Corp., 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950), the Third Circuit ruled that such
orders are not appealable, because they lack the "drastic and far-reaching effect" which is charac-
teristic of orders which grant or deny injunctions. In Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F.2d 936
(2d Cir. 1954), the Second Circuit reached a contrary result, permitting interlocutory appeal in
the same situation. Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit recently reversed its position and held that
such orders are not appealable under § 1292(a) (1). Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1966).
A month after this decision, the Supreme Court, in Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's
Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966), removed any remaining doubts by holding that a denial of a
motion for summary judgment is not appealable, because it does not settle or decide anything about
the merits of the claim. "It is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing-that the case
should go to trial." Id. at 25. Of significance in this opinion is the Court's discussion of 5
1292(a) (1) and the policy against permitting interlocutory appeals. "[W]e approach this statute,"
the Court said, "somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into exception many pre-
trial orders." Id. at 24. Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas observed: "Orders that in no
way touch on the merits of the claim but only relate to pretrial procedures are not in our view
'interlocutory' within the meaning of § 1292 (a) (1). We see no other way to protect the integrity
of the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals." Id. at 25.
5 Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); Formigli Corp. v. Alcar Builders, Inc., 329 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1964);
Cuneo Press v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Local 34, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
912 (1956); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). But see City of Morgantown
v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949). See generally 5 MooRE 39.13(27); 6 Id. 5 54.06(3),
54.07; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 102 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Note, Appeal-
ability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 373-75 (1961).
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a bill in the equity court, which would issue an injunction against prose-
cution of the plaintiff's action in the law court.' In Enelow v. New York
Life Insurance Co.' the United States Supreme Court reasoned that an
order staying proceedings in the plaintiff's action is a modern substitute
for such an injunction if the plaintiff's action would have been at law be-
fore the merger of law and equity s This reasoning, however, applies only
when the stay order would have required an equity court to issue an
injunction. If the stay order could have been issued either by a law court'
or by an equity court without resort to an injunction," the order issued
under modern procedure is not equivalent to a grant of an injunction
under the old procedure."
Finding an historical counterpart for the plaintiff's action is the key to
applying this rule. In most cases appeal may be taken under the Enelow
rule if the plaintiff's action historically would have been before a law
court. If all elements of the plaintiff's action are either legal or equitable
in character, this determination is relatively simple. But the Federal Rules
encourage the plaintiff to combine all of his claims, both legal and equi-
table in one action," frequently resulting in litigation which is a combi-
nation of legal and equitable elements."
6For a discussion of this procedure see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.8 (1965).
7 293 U.S. 379 (193 5). For general discussion see 5 MOORE j 39.13(2); 6 Id. 5 54.07.
8 The Court said, in effect, that a stay order issued under modern procedure where an injunction
would have been issued under the old procedure is the same thing as an injunction.
9 Both common law courts and equity courts had power to control the progress of the litigation
before them, but only a court of equity could order a stay of proceedings in another court. Jackson
Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Chronicle
Publishing Co. v. NBC, 294 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1961); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222
F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
10 If an order of a court of equity merely stayed proceedings in the same court, the order was
not an exercise of the court's equity powers. Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964); Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1962); Greenstein v. Nat'l Shirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 274 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1960); Wilson Bros.
v. Textile Workers Union, 224 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955). But see
Glen Oaks Utilities, Inc. v. Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960).
saA stay of proceedings pending the outcome of another suit is not equivalent to an injunction
because it does not restrain proceedings in another tribunal. Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303
F.2d 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d
Cir. 1961); Arny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 266 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1959); International Nickel
Co. v. Martin J. Barry, Inc., 204 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1952); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
National Elec. Prods. Corp., 127 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1942). Contra, Glen Oaks Utilities, Inc. v.
Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952). Likewise, a stay pending the outcome of administrative pro-
ceedings is not equivalent to an injunction. Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways,
340 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965); Chronicle Publishing Co. v. NBC,
294 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1961); Day v. Pennsylvania R.R., 243 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1957). But see
Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 18; WRIGHT § 78.
"3 For instance, if the plaintiff's only claim is for breach of contract and if the only remedy
he seeks is damages, the courts have had no difficulty in determining that the action is legal in char-
acter and that an appeal will lie under S 1292 (a) (1). E.g., Formigli Corp. v. Alcar Builders, Inc.,
329 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1964); Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.
1956). Damages, however, may not be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff, for he may need an
injunction, an accounting, imposition of trust, a declaratory judgment, or some other relief as well.
Once these equitable remedies are interjected, it bcomes less clear whether the action would have
been before an equity court or a law court.
Complicating this situation further is the possibility that the complaint may assert both legal
and equitable claims. For instance, the plaintiff's action might involve both breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty, or he might allege breach of one contract and seek specific performance
of another. On top of this, the plaintiff may seek various forms of relief on each of his claims.
As long as the Enelow rule stands, the courts of appeals must utilize some
method of deciding whether the plaintiff's action historically would have
been at law or in equity. So far, no court of appeals has laid down a clear
rule for making this determination, but two distinct approaches seem to
be developing. 4 One approach is what Judge Friendly has called the "dom-
inant purpose test.""1 The court asks whether the action is "basically and
predominantly an action at law."'" To answer this question, the court
looks at the plaintiff's complaint and sorts the various claims and demands
for relief into those which would have been heard by a law court and
those which would have been heard by an equity court. Then the court
determines which group is the more important to the plaintiff's action."
If the action is predominantly legal in character, with its equitable aspects
merely incidental to its legal aspects, the action may be considered one at
law and thus is appealable." If, however, the reverse is true, the suit is
considered one in equity and is not appealable. The advantage of this ap-
proach is simplicity in application, because the character of the action de-
pends on the court's characterization of each case brought before it."
In addition, this approach allows the appellate court a fairly large degree
of flexibility.
The second approach may be called the historical test, for it is essential-
ly an inquiry into the equity courts' jurisdiction. To prevent multiple liti-
gation of the same claims, an equity court had the power to take jurisdic-
"' At this point in time assigning a particular circuit to one camp or the other would be pre-
carious at best.
"Schine v. Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 688 (2d Cir. 1966) (concurring opinion). See discussion
accompanying note 28 infra.
"
0 Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
882 (1964).
17 One problem arising under the dominant purpose test is whether either the allegations of the
complaint or the relief demanded in the prayer should control the character of the action. Although
this problem has not troubled the courts in any of the cases utilizing this test, this distinction
would become important if a case should arise in which characterization of the action solely from
the allegations of the complaint would reach a different result than its characterization from the
relief demanded.
For a discussion of this problem as it relates to the right of jury trial see Schaeffer v. Gunzburg,
236 F.2d 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
'"Travel Consultants, Inc. v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Council of Western Elec. Technical Employees v. Western Elec. Co., 238 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1956);
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 372 (1961); cf. Professor
Wright's criticism of a similar test used to determine right to jury trial, WRIGHT S 92, at 354.
"9 The dominant purpose test apparently is an outgrowth of a now discredited suggestion by
Professor Moore that the parties' right to jury trial should be determined by the "basic nature"
of the issue. 5 MOORE 5 38.11 (6). When both legal and equitable issues are combined in a lawsuit,
the right to trial by jury is not lost, but the sequence of trial may be very important, for once
a trier of fact---either court or jury-determines a fact, that fact may not thereafter be redeter-
mined. Orenstein v. United States, 191 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951); 5 MOORE 5 38.15, at 148;
WRIGHT § 92, at 354; cf. Russell v. Laurel Music Corp., 104 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Re-
cent decisions have held that the legal issues should be tried first so that the right to jury trial
will not be lost. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1961). In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra, the Supreme Court repudiated the "basic nature"
test, holding that the right to jury trial should not be lost if demanded, "whether the trial judge
chooses to characterize the legal issues presented as 'incidental' to equitable issues or not." Id. at 473.
"oThis flexibility, however, is also a disadvantage, for it means that the test is uncertain in
application. If the only way to determine the character of the action is by appeal to the court of
appeals, much unnecessary litigation may arise.
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tion of legal as well as equitable elements of a lawsuit.' Once it obtained
jurisdiction over some phase of the suit, the equity court would decide all
issues and render complete relief, even though the remedy might be legal
in character." In applying the historical test, then, the court decides
whether an equity court would have invoked this extension of its jurisdic-
tion." If so, the action must be considered as one which would have been
in equity, and no appeal is possible under section 1292 (a) (1) Y
The historical test, however, seems more a device for preventing appeal
than a "test." In federal courts shortly before the merger of law and
equity the equity court's extension of its jurisdiction was freely invoked,"
so the courts applying the historical test readily determine that the action
would have been in equity. When used in this way the historical test
becomes no more than a formula which precludes all appeal from orders
staying proceedings in actions containing both legal and equitable ele-
ments.2
II. SCHINE V. SCHINE
In the recent case of Schine v. Schine s the Second Circuit adopted the
historical test and seemingly rejected the dominant purpose test. The case
arose out of a sale of stock in a family corporation, Schine Enterprises, Inc.
Plaintiffs sold their stock to defendants, who were officers, directors, and
majority stockholders in the corporation. Alleging that defendants wrong-
fully failed to disclose a real estate deal which was pending at the time of
sale, plaintiffs brought suit in federal court. They presented four claims,
the first and third of which alleged acts in violation of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In their second and fourth claims
plaintiffs alleged that by the same acts defendants had violated the fiduci-
ary duty they owed as officers, directors, and majority stockholders to the
25 See generally 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISIRUDENCE §§ 231, 236 (5th ed. Symons 1941); 4
Id. §§ 1362, 1363.
22 See M'Mullen Lumber Co. v. Strother, 136 F. 295, 305 (8th Cir. 1905); 1 J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 231 (5th ed. Symons 1941); 4 Id. § 1421.
23 In utilizing the historical test the courts are not forced to decide whether the appealability of
the order should hinge solely on either the character of the plaintiff's allegations or on his prayer
for relief, for appealability depends on the court which would have had jurisdiction of the entire
action prior to the merger of law and equity. Therefore, in characterizing the action, the court
must consider both the allegations and the relief sought, for a mere demand for equitable relief
would not necessarily render a suit cognizable in equity.
'Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962); City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
252 MOORE 5 2.05-06. Traditionally, common law courts were jealous of their jurisdiction of
legal elements of an action. See 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 231 (5th ed. Symons
1941).
'Cases cited note 24 supra.
27 The effect of this approach is to limit appeals under the Endow rule to those cases in which
the plaintiff's action is solely legal in character. In a more complex action containing both legal and
equitable elements there can be no appeal under the historical test.
The policy behind allowing interlocutory appeals from orders granting or refusing injunctions
is the "drastic and far-reaching effect" those orders may have on litigants. Morgenstern Chem. Co.
v. Schering Corp., 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950); see note 4 supra. If the historical test is followed,
the courts will be saying, in effect, that a stay order in a simple suit has such a "drastic and far-
reaching effect" but that a stay order in a more complex suit does not.
28367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
minority stockholders. On the first and second claims plaintiffs sought
damages, and on the third and fourth claims they sought an accounting
of profits.
At the time of the sale plaintiffs signed a release which purported to re-
lease defendants from liability for willful misrepresentations of the value
of the properties of the corporation. When their initial motion for sum-
mary judgment based on this release was denied," defendants counter-
claimed for enforcement of the release through an injunction against pros-
ecution of plaintiffs' action. Then defendants moved for a separate trial on
their counterclaim prior to trial of plaintiffs' action. When this motion
also was denied by the district judge," defendants, arguing that the order
was equivalent to a denial of an injunction under the Enelow rule, sought
appeal under section 1292 (a) (1).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on grounds
that the district judge's order was not a denial of such an injunction. The
court reasoned that a suit for an accounting based on breach of fiduciary
duty would have been cognizable in a court of equity prior to the merger
of law and equity. Since this claim would have gone to the equity court,
that court would have assumed jurisdiction of the other claims as well.
Thus there would have been no action in a court of law for an equity
court to enjoin."
Such reasoning is a good example of the approach taken by the courts
in applying the historical test. But in Schine the court, in addition, sug-
gested that the dominant purpose test may no longer be employed in the
Second Circuit. Previously, Ring v. Spina' was the leading case in the
Second Circuit holding that the character of an action depends on whether
the complaint and the relief sought are predominantly legal or equitable.
The Schine court held that Ring had been overruled to the extent that it
conflicts with Schine.' However, in a concurring opinion Judge Friendly
refused to discard the Ring approach. He would continue to examine the
plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the dominant purpose of the
complaint is legal or equitable. In cases of doubt he would conclude that
the claim is not one at law."
30250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
3' 25 4 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" Schine v. Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 687 (2d Cir. 1966). Though the order is not appealable
under § 1292(a)(1), the court noted that an interlocutory order such as that in Schine may be
appealed under § 1292(b) if the requirements of that subsection are met. But the court pointed out
that an order refusing a separate trial may "rarely, if ever," meet the requirements of that sub-
section. Id. at 688. This statement confirms what experience has already indicated: subsection (b),
though theoretically applicable to all interlocutory orders not covered by subsection (a), in practice
seldom applies to procedural orders. See Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167, 171
(N.D. Il. 1959) ("the interlocutory procedural order which would . . . [commend] itself [for
immediate appeal] would be almost as rare as the dodo"). But cf. Travel Consultants, Inc. v.
Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
For a discussion of the statute, see 7A MOORE § 1292, at JC-430-48; cf. WRIGHT § 102, at
403; Comment, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour
Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1959); Note, Appealability
in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. Ruv. 351, 380 (1961).
"166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948).
"Schine v. Schine, 367 F.2d 685 n.1 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. La Capria v. Compagnie Maritime
Beige, 373 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1967).




Schine and the historical test, by precluding appeal, reflect a policy now
followed by the federal courts. In Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger' the
Supreme Court indicated dissatisfaction with the Enelow rule, but the
majority expressed belief that action by Congress would be necessary to
eliminate it."7 Nevertheless, that case suggests a policy against allowing
interlocutory appeals from stay orders.8 It seems clear that the Court will
not sanction any widening of orders appealable under the Enelow rule.
Because it is impossible to classify as legal or equitable a hybrid form of
lawsuit which could not have existed under the old procedure, Professor
Wright, discussing the law-equity distinction as applied to the right to
jury trial, has suggested that resort must be had to policy. 9 This observa-
tion seems equally applicable when the right in question is the right to
take an interlocutory appeal from an order staying proceedings. Behind
the Enelow case was the tacit policy that modern procedural devices should
not limit rights available under the older procedure. Today, the smooth
operation of the Federal Rules has become a more important policy in
federal courts than the preservation of antiquated distinctions. Now there
is only one form of action in federal courts,' and under that action the
litigants may bring all of their claims. 1 The district court proceeds on
these claims generally without regard for their historical origins.' A stay
order, for instance, acts no differently in a modern action combining
legal and equitable elements than it did in a common law action based
on several legal claims. In both cases the plaintiff's action is temporarily
held up by the court, but no separate proceeding is enjoined, and in most
cases there is no danger of irreparable harm to or a drastic effect on the
litigants.' Thus a stay order possesses neither the effect nor the attributes
of an injunction.
The policy governing interlocutory appeals today seems to be that pro-
cedural orders should not be appealable. As long as the Enelow rule stands,
this policy cannot receive full expression, but Schine reveals an inclination
to limit the exceptions to that policy. Litigants in federal court may expect
courts of appeals to look with increasing disfavor on interlocutory appeals
from stay orders if Schine's historical approach becomes the standard.
Rufus S. Scott
3348 U.S. 176 (1955).
"7Id. at 185. But see Justice Black's dissenting opinion, id. at 186.
aId. at 181.
89 WRIGHT § 92, at 354.
40 FED. R. Csv. P. 2.4 1
FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
42 The only exception is when the litigants' right to jury trial is in question. This right is subject
to the special provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 38. See note 19 supra.
'If a motion for a stay to permit a separate trial of a counterclaim is denied, the defendant
still has an opportunity to litigate the counterclaim at its proper place in the lawsuit. Even if the
denial of such a motion is in error, the judge may correct his error during the trial, or if the liti-
gant is prejudiced by the order, he may appeal from the court's final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1964).
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